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The  paper  analytically  explores  the  optimal  policy  mix  between  mitigation  and  environmental 
adaptation  against  climate  change  at  a  macroeconomic  level.  The  constructed  economic-
environmental model is formulated as a social planner problem with the adaptation and abatement 
investments as separate decision variables. The authors prove the existence of a unique steady state 
and provide a comparative static analysis of the optimal investment. It leads to essential implications 
for associated long-term environmental policies. In particular, the dependence of the optimal ratio 
between abatement and adaptation investments on economic efficiency appears to have an inverted 
U-shape. Data calibration and numerical simulation are provided to illustrate theoretical outcomes. 
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1. Introduction 
In the anticipation of forthcoming climate change, households, communities, and 
regulators need to implement measures that reduce the vulnerability of natural and human 
systems, which are known as adaptation. The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report defines 
adaptation to climate change as “an adjustment in natural or human systems in response to 
actual  or  expected  climatic  stimuli  or  their  effects,  which  moderates  harm  or  exploits 
beneficial  opportunities”.  By  contrast,  mitigation  is  defined  as  “an  anthropogenic 
intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases” (IPCC, 2007, 
chap. 18, p. 750).
2 In fact, the single term adaptation covers a nebulous of actions such as 
investment in a coastal protection infrastructure, diversification of crops, implementation 
of warning systems, improvement in water resource management, development of new 
insurance instruments, modification of air cooling devices, etc. Hence, to deal with climate 
change the human society has two main long-term strategies: to mitigate greenhouse gas 
emissions  or  to  adapt  to  global  warming.
3  The  economic  and  environmental  science 
literature has scrupulously analyzed the cost and effectiveness of mitigation but has paid 
sufficiently less attention to adaptation.
4
The  cost of  adaptation  measures must  not  be  underestimated.  According  to the 
World Bank, 2009, the studies available in the literature provide a wide range of estimates: 
adapting between 2010 and 2050 to a 2°C warmer world by 2050 would cost between 75 
and 100 billion USD per  year. This amount is of the same order of  magnitude as the 
foreign aid that developed countries currently give developing countries each year, but it is 
still a very low percentage of the wealth of the developed countries as measured by their 
GDP. Another recent study conducted on behalf of the UNFCCC for the year 2030 on five 
sectors (water supply, human health, coastal zones, forestry, and fisheries) estimates the 
average cost of adaption between 28 and 67 billion USD per year in developing countries 
(UNFCCC, 2007). There also exists an extensive, but uneven and not exhaustive, literature 
on adaptation costs and benefits at the sector level, see, for example (Rosenzweig and 
Parry, 1994; Adams et al., 2003; Reilly et al, 2003) for the agricultural sector, (Morrison 
and Mendelsohn, 1999; Sailor and Pavlova, 2003; Mansur et al., 2005) for energy demand, 
(Fankhauser, 1995; Yohe and Sclesinger, 1998; Nicholls and Tol, 2006) for sea-level rise. 
A  little  attention  has  been  given  to  water  resource  management  (EEA,  2007), 
transportation infrastructure (Kirshen et al., 2007), health, or tourism. It follows from these 
examples that, in contrast to mitigation, adaptation more frequently occurs at each level of 
human activity. It starts nationwide and spreads to cities, municipalities, and households. 
Environmental adaptation possesses essential potential benefits that should be used wisely. 
  
                                                 
2  There  exists  a  difference  between  mitigation  and  abatement:  the  former  refers  to  a  reduction  in  net 
emissions of greenhouse gases while the latter refers to a reduction in gross emissions. Most theoretical 
models integrate only emission abatement opportunities (i.e. no sinks). It will also be the case in our paper.  
3 Two other options are also available, carbon sequestration and geo-engineering, but their contribution to 
cope with the problem of global warming is less important (see IPCC,2007).  
4 For a synthesis of current works devoted to abatement scenarios, see the Energy Modeling Forum 22 in the 
special issue of Energy Economics, 31, 2009.  ﾠ  
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For  these  reasons,  adaptation  has  now  reached  the  top  of  the  policy  agenda  in  most 
countries.
5
As stressed by (IPCC, 2007, chap. 18; UNFCCC, 2007; Agrawal and Fankhauser, 
2008)  adaptation  offers  many  appealing  and  innovative  characteristics  as  a  policy 
instrument. Three of them deserve to be mentioned here. First, some adaptation measures 
are drawn by private agents’ self-interest (e.g. air cooling in dwellings) while others have 
the property of a public good (e.g. dams). So the first policy issue about adaptation is to set 
the right incentives to reach an optimal level of adaptation. The second characteristic is 
that some developing  countries do not have the financial capacity to  address  adequate 
adaptation  measures.  This  can  prevent  such  countries  from  implementing  the  optimal 
policy and impede their participation in international agreements.
 This contrasts with the spare economic literature devoted to it. 
6
While Shalizi and Lecocq, 2009 stress the need for an integrated portfolio of policy 
actions to minimize the climate bill, only a few studies explicitly consider adaptation and 
mitigation as policy  responses to climate change. Some are descriptive (e.g. Kane and 
Yohe,2000;  Smit  et  al.,  2000;  Agrawal  and  Fankhauser,  2008;  EEA,2007;  UNFCCC, 
2007). Other papers use a game-theoretic framework, either static (Shalizi and Lecocq, 
2009; Kane and Shogren, 2000) or dynamic (Buob and Stephan, 2010). Some others use 
computational integrated assessment models (Bosello et al., 2009; de Bruin et al., 2009). 
Among  key  questions  addressed  by  these  papers,  the  first  one  is  to  know  whether 
mitigation and adaptation are substitutes or complementary policy instruments, and the 
second question is to know whether the  country's stage of development influences the 
optimal  policy  mix  between  mitigation  and  adaptation.  To  date,  the  first  question still 
remains open. Buod and Stephan (2010) answer the second question, arguing that high 
income  countries  should  invest  in  both  mitigation  and  adaptation,  while  low  income 
countries should invest only in mitigation. In our paper, we propose a novel theoretical 
framework to address these two questions and provide original answers to each of them. In 
particular,  we  challenge  the  result  of  Buob  and  Stephan  and  show  that  the  issue  of 
substitutability between the two instruments depends on the stage of development.  
 However, the third and 
even more important issue is that, although if people can protect themselves from some 
adverse impacts of climate change, they cannot fully avoid them. Because adaptation does 
not tackle the causes of climate change, the world cannot afford to neglect abatement in 
greenhouse  gas  emissions.  So,  a  key  issue  is  to  find  the  optimal  balance  between 
adaptation  measures  and  emission  abatement  in  order  to  implement  an  effective  and 
efficient long-term climate policy.  
In  this  paper  we  focus  on  a  long-term  dynamic  analysis  of  a  model  with 
accumulation in physical capital, greenhouse gases, and adaptation capital. To do this, we 
rule out the strategic dimension of the question addressed by Buod and Stephan (2010) and 
the  role  of  endogeneous  risk  addressed  by  Shalizi  and  Lecocq  (2009)  and  Kane  and 
Shogren  (2000).  In  summary,  we  provide  an  analytic  framework  for  studying  optimal 
investment levels and associated long-term policies that encompass both mitigation and 
adaptation.  
                                                 
5 For a policy agenda update, see the UNFCCC web page devoted to adaptation: http://unfccc.int/adaptation. 
6 During the UNFCCC Copenhagen conference, one of the  hottest policy questions  was  the  funding  of 
adaptation in developing countries and the required financial transfers from industrialized ones.  ﾠ  
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The goal of our paper is to analytically explore the optimal policy mix between 
mitigation and adaptation in response to climate changes at the macroeconomic level. The 
constructed economic-environmental model combines adaptation and emission abatement 
investments for the first time in economic literature. In formulating our model, we follow 
the  mainstream  of  macroeconomic  growth  models  with  the  environmental  quality  and 
investments. Gradus and Smulders (1993) and Smulders and Gradus (1996) are among the 
first  to  analyze  long-term  growth  models  with  pollution,  which  involve  spending  on 
abatement activities. They model pollution as a flow rather than a stock. Stokey (1998) 
analyzes the optimal technology choice in several models with the pollution as both a flow 
and a stock, but without spending on abatement or pollution cleanup. Her models include 
the control of a technology index that linearly impacts the output and nonlinearly impacts 
the pollution. The abatement process is described in Byrne (1997) and Vellinga (1999) 
similarly  to  an  environmental  clean-up  process.  More  recently,  Economides  and 
Philippopoulos (2008) examine optimal cleanup and public infrastructure policies through 
distorting  tax  in  a  general  equilibrium  model  with  renewable  natural  resources  and 
compare them with a corresponding social planner problem. They classify their approach 
as close to Stokey (1998) but use renewable natural resources rather than pollution as the 
environmental  quality  indicator.  Here  we  follow  the  commonly  accepted  abatement 
description of Gradus and Smulders (1993) and their followers (e.g., Chen et al., 2009).       
The  present  paper  suggests  an  aggregated  economic-environmental  model  with 
both abatement and adaption investments and considers a related social planner problem. 
We choose the specifications of production and pollution processes and social preferences 
and justify the model in Section 2. Section 3 proves the existence of a unique steady state 
in the model without adaptation and derives some qualitative conclusions about optimal 
abatement  policies.  Here  we  employ  perturbation  techniques  and  obtain  approximate 
analytic formulas for the steady state, which allow for a further comparative static analysis 
of the optimal policies. Section 4 analyzes the model with abatement and adaption and 
demonstrates  essential  economic  implications  of the  obtained  results.  In  particular,  the 
dependence of the optimal policy mix between abatement and adaption investments on the 
economy scale is shown to be of an inverted U-shape. Data calibration and some numeric 
simulation  of  the  optimal  policies  are  provided  in  Section  5. Section  6  concludes and 
indicates possible extensions of research.  
 
2. The model   
We use the Solow-Swan one-sector growth framework in which the economy uses 
a Cobb-Douglas technology with constant returns to produce a single final good Y. The 
social planner allocates the final good across the consumption C, the investment IK into the 
physical  capital  K,  the  investment  ID
          
  into  the  environmental  adaptation  D,  and  the 
emission abatement expenditures B in order to maximize the utility of the infinitely lived 
representative household:  
dt t D t P t C U e
t





)) ( ), ( ), ( ( max
U                                (1)   
                            IK(t)  ID(t) C(t)   ﾠ  
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subject to the following constraints:  
Y(t) = AK
D(t) = IK(t) + ID(t)  + B(t) + C(t),                             (2)   
K ’(t) = IK(t)  GKK(t),       K(0)=K0,                                                      (3)   
D ’(t) = ID(t)  GDD(t),      D(0)=D0,                                                      (4)   
where U>0 is the rate of time preference, A>0 and 0<D<1 are parameters of the 
Cobb-Douglas  production  function,  GKt0,  GD
The choice of a law of motion for the pollution P represents a major step in the 
problem under study (Toman and Withagen, 2000; Jones and Manuelli, 2001). Following 
Stokey (1998),  Hritonenko and Yatsenko (2005), and some more recent works (e.g., Chen 
et  al.,  2009),  and  because of  our  interest  in  climate change,  we  shall  assume  that the 
pollution is accumulated as a stock.
t0  are  scrapping  coefficients  for  physical 
capital and adaptation capital. The environmental quality is measured by P. The utility 
function  (1)  depends  on  the  consumption  C,  the  environmental  quality  P,  and  the 
environmental adaptation capital D. 
7 The pollution inflow (net emission) is assumed to be 
proportional to the output Y. The abatement activity B is also a flow (Gradus and Smulders, 
1993;  Vellinga,  1999).  The  pollution  stock  grows  as  the  net  emission  increases  and 
declines as abatement expenditures B increase. Despite its simplicity, our specification 
captures  the  major  qualitative  features  of  the  abatement  activity  B  (see  Gradus  and 
Smulders, 1993).
8
          P ’(t) = GPP(t) + JY(t)/B(t),            P(0)=P0.                                     (5)  
 Thus, the pollution motion is:    
The  emission  factor  J>0  in  (5)  characterizes  the  environmental  dirtiness  of  the 
economy.  To  be  more  precise,  it  provides  the  net  flow  of  pollution,  that  is,  the  flow 
resulting from productive activity net of abatement efforts. The pollution stock increases 
with this flow and deteriorates in time at a constant natural decay rate GP
The model (1)-(5) incorporates the key ingredients of the problem we are interested 
in.  In particular, it will allow us to discuss the optimal policy mix (between emission 
abatement  and  adaptation)  with  respect  to  the  stage  of  development  of  the  economy. 
Hereafter,  we  shall  discuss  two  polar  cases.  On  one  hand,  a  developing  country  is 
characterized by both a relatively small global factor productivity (small A) and a relatively 
high  impatience  degree  (high  U),  and,  on  the  other  hand,  a  developed  (industrialized) 
country possesses a high global productivity and smaller impatience. The question behind 
this comparison is the following: should the policy role of adaptation be different with the 
stage of development of a country?  
>0.  
                                                 
7 Thus, P represents the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. For simplification, we shall 
consider this as a proxy to temperature increase, the latter is the real (though also approximate) causal factor 
for climate change welfare losses. This approximation is acceptable as temperature increase depends on the 
concentration of greenhouse gases, with some lags. See the fourth report of IPCC (2007). 
8 Smulders and Gradus (1996) also consider a more general polluting model as the flow Y
YB
O,  O!Y.  ﾠ  
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Some discussions will be also done with respect to the pollution intensity of the 
economy J. Empirically, the link between pollution intensity and global factor productivity 
is not that straightforward. Economic development may go with higher carbon intensity, 
but it may also lead to decarbonization (because of increased global productivity, energy or 
carbon saving technological progress, dematerialization, etc.).  
The optimization problem (1)-(5) includes three decision variables IK, ID, C, four 
state variables K, D, B, P, and four constraints-equalities (2)-(5). The major novelty of the 
problem  is  the  dependence  of  U(C,  P,  D)  on  the  adaptation  expense  D.  In  line  with 
common  specifications  in  the  environmental  literature  (Gradus  and  Smulders,  1993; 
Stokey,  1998;
9
                    U(C, P, D) = U1(C)  U2(P, D) 
  Byrne,  1997;  Hritonenko  and  Yatsenko,  2005;  Economides  and 











D C ,              (6) 
where the factor K(D) describes the environmental vulnerability of the economy to 
climate change. Being a key ingredient of our paper, the function K(D) reflects the fact that 
the environmental vulnerability K can be reduced by investing in adaptation. In that sense, 
the  function  K(D)  can  be  also  interpreted  as  the  efficiency  of  adaptation  measures  to 
protect  people  from  the  damages  of  climate  change.  The  parameterP>0  reflects  the 
negative increasing marginal utility of pollution, which is a common assumption in such 
models. The specific choice of the function K(D) will be provided and discussed in Section 
4 below. Many other specifications of the production and pollution dynamics are possible.  
 
3.  Benchmark model with abatement  
In order to understand the basic dynamic properties of model (1)-(6), let us start 
with  its  benchmark  version  with  pollution  abatement,  but  without  adaptation,  i.e.,  at 























U ,     IK(t)C(t)           (7)   
AK
D(t) = IK(t) + B(t) + C(t),                                                   (8) 
K ’(t) = IK(t)  GK(t),                           K(0)=K0,                                        (9)   
P ’(t) = GPP(t) + J AK
D (t)/B(t),            P(0)=P0,                                   (10)  
where G =GK
                                                 
9  Stokey (1998) considers a CRRA utility of consumption rather than the logarithmic one. 
. The current-value Hamiltonian for the problem (7)-(10) is given by   ﾠ  
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where the dual variables O1, O2, O3 are associated with equalities (8)-(10) and P1, 
P2  are  related  to  the  irreversibility  constraints  IK C.  The  first  order  extremum 
conditions for the two decision variables IK
                    
 and C are:  
, 0 1 3 1      P O O                                (12) 
                    , 0 2 1
1    
  P O
Ut e C                             (13) 
or, in the case of an interior solution,  
                    
t e C
U O O
     
1
3 1 .                              (14) 
The first order conditions for the state variables K, B and P are, respectively:  
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and  the  transversality  conditions  take  the  form  of  0 ) ( lim ) ( lim 3 2    
f o f o t t
t t O O . 
Excluding O1, O2,O3
            
 from (15)-(17) and using (8)-(10), we obtain the system in K, B, C 
and P: 
, ' K C B K AK     G
D                                    (18) 
             ,
' 1 U G D D
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K D
P .              (21) 
System (18)-(21) determines the interior optimal dynamics. This dynamics in the 
case of small values K should be close to the well-known neoclassical Solow-Swan model 
(Barro  and  Sala-i-Martin,  1995),  which  has  an  asymptotically  stable  steady–state 
equilibrium at D<1. Similar result for our model is proven in Proposition 1.  ﾠ  
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Proposition 1. The problem (7)-(10) possesses the unique steady state: 
               , / ) ( D U G
D     K K A B              (22) 
               , / / ) 1 ( D U D D G K K C                   (23) 
               ,
] / ) ( [
1 D U G G
J
D  
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where K , 0<K <  D U G D   1
1
) /( A , is found from the nonlinear equation  
                    .
) (





















                        (25) 
Proof. See Appendix 1.  
As shown in Appendix 1, the nonlinear equation (25) always has a unique positive 
solutionK ,  
                                     0<K <  D U G D   1
1
) /( A .                                                (26) 
The last term of this inequality is the maximal capital stock level (which will be 
defined below). As in the standard Solow-Swan model, the optimal trajectories K(t),  B(t), 
C(t), and P(t) asymptotically converge to the steady state  K ,  B ,  C , and  P . Setting a 
maximum  limit  P for  the  pollution  level  P  is  commonly  accepted  in  environmental 
economic  literature  to  avoid  a  further  degeneration  of  the  environmental  quality  (see 
Smulders  and  Gradus,  1996;  Bovenberg  and  Smulders,  1996;  Elbasha  and  Roe,  1996; 
Hritonenko and Yatsenko, 2005). By Proposition 1, our model produces such dynamics. 
       The comparative statics analysis based on (22)-(25) can shed some light on 
qualitative  properties  of  the  economy  and  the  relation  between  the  optimal  long-term 
abatement policy and model parameters. First, it appears that shifting to a lower pollution 
intensity  J  increases  the  size  of  the  economyK .  It  also  leads  to  smaller  abatement 
expenses  B and  to  a  smaller  pollution  levelP .  Thus,  a  cleaner  technology  is 
unambiguously good for the economy. If J approaches 0, then  K  tends to its maximum 
level  D U G D   1
1
) /( A ,  whileB and  P tend  to  zero.  Second,  if  the  vulnerability  of  the 
economy to climate change increases, then the whole economy downsizes (smallerK ), the 
pollution level decreases but abatement expenditures increase. If K tends to 0, then  K  
tends  to  its  maximum  level,  B   tends  to  zero,  and  P tends  to  the  infinity.  Third,  the 
economy  also  strongly  depends  on  the  natural  decay  rate  of  pollution  GP.  If  the 
environmental decay rate GP P  becomes smaller, then the pollution level   increases and the 
size of the economyK shrinks. Indeed, it is more and more difficult to control a pollution 
stock when its decay rate becomes very small. If a pollution removal is negligible, that is, 
GP K ĺ  then  andB tend  to  zero  while  P tends  to  the  infinity.  This  flows  from  the 
restricted abatement efficiency in the pollution motion (10), where abatement can only 
keep the pollution emission stable, but cannot decrease it to zero. It is also related to the 
negative  increasing  marginal  utility  of  the  pollution  stock  (at  P>0),  in  particular,  K   ﾠ  
  9 
remains positive at GP=0 if one assumes that P=0.
10 So, the natural decay rate plays a 
critical role in our problem. In the mechanics of climate change, greenhouse gases that 
cause global warming remain for a very long time in the atmosphere, and the natural decay 
rate of this stock is extremely low.
11
Let  us  now  consider  the  use  of  the  only  policy  instrument 
       
B available  in  this 
section to cope with climate change. An analysis of formula (22) and nonlinear equation 
(25) shows that both optimal steady state capital  K  and abatement  B increase as    D  1
1
A  
when  the  global  productivity  A  increases.
12 K B /   Correspondingly,  the  optimal  ratio   
appears to be independent of the productivity A (the derivative of B/K in A is zero). 
      In order to provide a further comparative static analysis, an explicit formula for 
the solution  K  of equation (25) would be highly desirable. To obtain such approximate 
analytic  formulas,  we  employ  perturbation  techniques  (small  parameter  methods)  well 
known in such applied sciences as physics and engineering but relatively less common in 
economics.  Some  economic  examples  are provided  in  (Araujo  and  Scheinkman,  1977; 
Boucekkine  et  al.,  2008;  Cosimano,  2008;  Gaspar  and  Judd,  1997;  Hritonenko  and 
Yatsenko, 2005; Judd and Guu, 1997; Khan and Rashid, 1982; Santos, 1994; or Wagener, 
2006). The general idea of such methods is to reduce a problem under study to a simpler 
problem with a known solution (or a solution algorithm). In economics, such techniques 
are usually followed by a numeric solution, but they can also lead to approximate analytic 
solutions.  
       One of key challenges of the perturbation techniques is to identify a model 
parameter such that the general problem is reduced to a simpler one when the parameter is 
zero. As shown in Appendix 1, the convenient choice for such a parameter in our model is  



















                              (27) 
This parameter Nhas some appealing economic interpretation directly related to 
the major contribution of our paper, namely, it encompasses the net pressure of human 
activity on the environment, that is, the pollution intensity J of economic activity compared 
to  the  natural  decay  rate  GP  of  the  pollution  stock.  It  is  weighted  by  the  degree  Kof 
vulnerability of the economy. These properties of the parameter Nlead us to interpret it as 
a Nindicator of environmental pressure, which combines both the pressure JGP
                                                 
10 Similar qualitative dynamics of economic and environmental parameters are common in the economic-
environmental models available in the literature, even when a much more detailed description of pollution 
accumulation and assimilation is considered (see, e.g., Toman and Withagen, 2000). 
 on the 
environment and the pressure K of the environment on welfare. The third factor in (27) 
involves other parameters but, if one considers that G as it will be done later in the 
paper, then this factor would be close to one.  
11 The three main greenhouse gases have the following lifetime in the atmosphere: carbon dioxide (CO2): 100 
to 150 years, methane (CH4): 10 years, nitrous oxide (N2O): 100 years (IPCC, 2007).  
12  It  matches  the  result  of  Smulders  and  Gradus  (1996)  that  “…an  increase  in  environmental  care  is 
associated with an increase in growth”.  ﾠ  
  10 
Using  perturbation  techniques,  we  can  show  that  the  following  approximate 
formulas are valid
13 K  for  (see Appendix 1 for the proof): 
















K   at    1 !! N ,                                                    (28) 
































K   at   1  N .                                              (29) 
As it may be expected, the optimal size of an economy is directly related to the 
environmental pressure it exerts on the environment, as expressed by the N-indicator. More 
interestingly,  this  dependence  is  weak  when  the  environmental  pressure  is  small  (N-
indicator << 1), but the dependence becomes stronger as the pressure increases (N-indicator 
>> 1).  
In the following sections we will focus on the case (28) (large N-indicator) because 
it  captures  the  situation  faced  by  the  world  today:  the  environmental  self–cleaning 
capability GP is negligible compared to the emission impact factor J and the environmental 
vulnerability K. This fact will be formally expressed as an assumption in the next section 
and  empirically  discussed  in  Section  5.  As  already  mentioned,  the  decay  rate  for 
atmospheric greenhouse gases concentrations is extremely small. In addition, the current 
vulnerability to climate change turns out to be more important than expected a few years 
ago, notably because of a faster pace for global warming and more local extreme events 
than predicted (hurricanes, droughts, floods…).
14
Now let us introduce the possibility of reducing the damages of climate change, 
that is, adaptation.    
 Finally, current power generation and 
transportation  systems  are  mainly  based  on  fossil  fuel  technologies.  Because  a 
revolutionary carbon-free technology does not come out yet, our economies are bound to 
spend money in order to reduce their carbon dependence (i.e., abatement expenditures) 
which is also captured by our choice of (28). 
   
4.  A model with abatement and adaptation 
Let us return to the original problem (1)-(6) and analyze how the possibility of the 
adaptation  D  affects  the  qualitative  results  obtained  in  Section  3.  Let  GK=GD
                                                 
13  Here  and  thereafter,  the  notation  f  (H)
=G.  The 
current-value Hamiltonian for the problem (1)-(6) is given by  
# g(H)  means  that  f  (H) g(H)[1+o(H)]  for  some  small  parameter 
0<H and f(H)og(H) when Ho0.  
14 As IPCC (2007) states, extreme events are becoming more frequent and temperature increase is going 
faster than expected.   ﾠ  
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where the dual variables O1, O2, O3, O4, are associated with equalities (2)-(5) and 
P1, P2, P3 reflect the irreversibility constraints. The first order conditions for IK, ID
                 
 and C 
are:  
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which, in the case of interior solutions, leads to 
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The first order conditions for the state variables K, B, P and D are, respectively:  
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Excluding O1, O2, O3 and O4
            
 from (35)-(38) and using (2)-(5), we obtain the system  
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for the optimal interior solution K, B, C, D, and P. 
     To proceed  further  with our analysis,  we need  a more specific form for the 
function  K(D).  A  good  choice  that  possesses  realistic  features  will  be  the  following 
exponential function:  
                          
aD e D
     ) ( ) ( K K K K ,   with K >K>0,   a>0.          (44) 
Indeed, the function (44) is monotonically decreasing in adaptation efforts and goes 
down from a maximum value K(0)=K >K of environmental vulnerability, reached when 
there is no adaptation at all, to a minimum value K()=K>0, reached when adaptation  ﾠ  
  12 
efforts tend to infinity. The function Kis illustrated in Figure 1. The first derivative of 
K
aD e a D
     ) ( ) ( ' K K K , suggests us to introduce the parameter  
                                      ) ( K K K    0 a                                                           (45) 
as the technological potential for adaptation of the economy under consideration. 
In (45),  ) ( K K   represents the range of physical adaptation opportunities, i.e. the benefits 
in terms of vulnerability reduction associated with adaptation measures. Depending on the 
physical characteristics of the economy (altitude, importance of coastal areas, etc.), the 
range of adaptation measures can be more or less wide. As a consequence, the potential 
welfare gain between no adaptation and full adaptation can vary depending on the country, 
which is captured by the difference  ) ( K K   in (45). The exponential form of (44) reflects 
the assumption of decreasing returns of the adaptation investment D, which is natural by 
technological and economic applications. Indeed, initial adaptation measures are supposed 
to be the most efficient in terms of vulnerability reduction. In other words, the parameter a 
represents the marginal efficiency of adaptation, which is higher for the first adaptation 
measures and then decreases gradually with the amount of investment (see Figure 1). For 
instance,  the  first  adaptation  projects  (e.g.,  dams)  can  significantly  decrease  the 
environmental  vulnerability  of  a  specific  country/region  while  the  further  (smaller) 




4.1. The existence and properties of the steady state  
       To keep the analytic complexity feasible, we will restrict ourselves with the 
long-term dynamics (steady state) and no capital depreciation, G=0.  
Proposition 2. The economy given by equations (39)-(43) possesses a unique steady state: 
, /D U
D K K A B                        (46) 
, /D U K C                              (47) 
,
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where the steady state components K , 0<K
<(DA/U)
1/(1D), and D t0.  
If  K  is small, then optimal  D =0. Otherwise,  K >0  and  D >0 are determined by the 
following system of two equations : 
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Proof. See Appendix 2. 
                                                 
15 Alternative hypotheses on the function K(D) are possible and are of obvious interest.   ﾠ  
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By Proposition 2, the optimal adaptation level  is  D =0 and the vulnerability is 
maximal,  K K K     ) 0 ( ) (D , for small values of  K from some interval [0, c K ]. In this case, 
the  optimal  capital  has  the  unique  solution  (28)  as  in  the  model  without  adaptation 
described by Proposition 1. Proposition 2 expresses the range for positive adaptation in 
terms of the endogenous variableK and is not specific enough in answering whether and 
when the optimal adaptation can be positive, D >0. 
 
4.2. On the range of positive optimal adaptation   
To  express  the  condition  for  the  positive  optimal  adaptation  D >0  in  terms  of 
model parameters, we shall consider the case where the value of the N-indicator is high 
when the environmental vulnerability is minimal, i.e. when no adaptation measures are 
implemented ( K K K     ) 0 ( ) (D ). This leads to the following assumption.   
Assumption A1.   1

















.                         (51) 
Empirical evidence to support this assumption for the current world economy will 
be provided in Section 5 below. Then the following result is valid. 
 
Proposition 3. Under Assumption A1 and the restriction  
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the system (49)-(50) has a unique solution (K ,  D ) with a positive optimal adaptation 
level given by 
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 > 0.                          (53) 
If condition (52) does not hold, then the optimal adaptation  D is the corner (zero) 
solution and the optimalK  is determined from (49) at D =0 as: 
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Proof. See Appendix 2. 
 
Formula  (54)  directly  follows  from  (27)  and  (28)  where  K  is  replaced  by  K  
reached in the absence of adaptation. It appears that the adaptation policy  D >0 is positive 
only under some restrictions on the model parameters. This restriction suggests a balance 
between the technological potential for adaptation, a ) ( K K   and the factor productivity A,  ﾠ  
  14 
on one side, and the limit of environmental vulnerability K , the pollution intensity J, and 
the natural pollution assimilation rate GP
If  the  adaptation  opportunities or  their  marginal  efficiency  are  too  small  in  the 
economy, then (52) does not hold and the optimal adaptation level 
, on the other.  
D  is zero. In other 
words, there exists a minimal level of the adaptation potential below which (52) does not 
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a              (55) 
of the adaptation potential under which optimal adaptation is zero. The formula 
(55) is determined from (52) with the equality sign instead of inequality. The following 
corollary provides the main properties of this critical value.   
Corollary  1  (on  the  critical  potential  adaptation  value).  The  critical  value 
cr K 0 = )] ( [ K K  a cr
K 0
 for the adaptation potential is smaller for a greater global productivity 
of the economy A and a smaller discount factor Uceteris paribus.  If  > cr K 0 , i.e., (52) 
holds, then the optimal  D >0 is larger for a greater productivity factor A and a smaller 
discount factor U.   
Let us interpret this corollary. When the economy is very productive, it can support 
adaptation measures of smaller efficiency and, on the other side, the opportunity cost of 
adaptation (which is consumption) is less important compared to the environment quality 
in the utility function. Furthermore, it also appears that the threshold value  cr K 0  is smaller 
for smaller discount factors U. Hence, because of these two effects, it can be expected that 
a developed country (A large, U small) will engage itself sooner in adaptation measures 
than a developing country (A small, U large) ceteris paribus.   
Two  other  effects  of  Corollary  1  are  also  deserved  to  be  mentioned.  First,  the 
threshold value given by (55) for the adaptation marginal efficiency is smaller for a smaller 
pollution intensity J
16 Indeed, a smaller Jalso means less efficient abatement activities, 
which opens a room for the adaptation sooner. Second, the threshold (55) increases for 
smaller  natural  pollution  depreciation  factors  GP  because  the  adaptation  measures  are 
accumulated as a stock, while abatement measures last just one time period. So, when the 
stock  effect  of  pollution  is  very  important  (GP
                                                 
16 The optimal adaptation D is always positive at J=0 when the abatement B does not impact the pollution 
level.  
  is  small),  then  the  relative  benefits  of 
investing in long-lasting measures increase. When the pollution does not accumulate or is 
self-cleaned rapidly, then flow-abatement measures are more efficient. Thus, the optimal 
policy arbitrage between spending the resources of the economy in a stock (adaptation 
measures) or in a flow (abatement measures) depends on the nature of the pollutant. The 
relative  importance  of  environment-related  investments  increases  as  the  lifetime  of  the 
pollutant gets longer.   ﾠ  
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        If the restriction (52) is not valid, then the optimal adaptation level  D =0, and 
the capital K has the unique solution (54). If (52) holds, then, as established by Proposition 
2, there exist a unique optimal capital level  K , 0<K <(A/U)
1/(1D)
D
, and the corresponding 
unique optimal adaptation level  >0 found from equations (49) and (50).  
 
4.3. On the optimal adaptation - abatement policy mix  
Solving  the  nonlinear  equations  (49)-(50)  enables  us  to  provide  specific  policy 
recommendations and find the optimal policy mix between adaptation and abatement. We 
can obtain such an explicit approximate solution under assumptions on the economic and 
adaptation efficiency stricter than (51):  
Assumption A2.        1

















              (56) 
Assumption B.           N
U
D









.                                                              (57) 
Assumption A2 implies that even when the economy has reached its minimal level 
of vulnerability, the value of its Nindicator of environmental pressure remains high. So, 
Assumption A2 is stricter than Assumption A1 because it includes the minimal possible 
vulnerability K rather than the maximal vulnerability K  as in (51). This means that the 
economy cannot fully avoid the adverse effects of pollution, even when all the adaptation 
measures are implemented. Again, it seems to be a relevant assumption for climate change. 
Assumption  B  indicates  that  the  ratio  of  the  global  productivity  A  and  the  adaptation 
efficiency a to the discount factor U is much larger than the previous ratio  N  (which is 
already large). The feasibility of Assumptions A2 and B for the current world economy is 
discussed in Section 5. Under Assumptions A2 and B, the optimal steady state capital 
K and adaptation  D levels are determined by the approximate formulas (see Appendix 2 
for the proof): 
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D .                      (59) 
 
The only difference between the approximate formulas (58) and (54) is that (58) 
includes the vulnerability  K reached at large  D >>1 and (54) has the vulnerability  K   ﾠ  
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reached at  D =0. To demonstrate the benefits of adaptation and abatement management 
versus the case with no adaptation, let us denote the optimal steady state solutions (58), 
(46)-(48) as (K D C ,  D B ,  D P ,  D
K
) and the corresponding optimal steady state solutions 
(28), (22)-(24) in the model with no adaptation as ( ND C ,   ND B ,   ND P ,  ND
Corollary 2 (on the comparison with and without adaptation). Under Proposition 
3, if adaptation is positive, then  
   (i) the size of the economy is larger, 
).  
K D  K > ND
P
 ; 
   (ii) the pollution level is higher,  D P  > ND
K B /
 ;  
   (iii) the relative abatement efforts are smaller, ( )D K B / <( )ND























































 < 1.          
Since the adaptation enhances the flexibility of the economy and allows it to suffer 
less from a given level of pollution, a suitable level of adaptation is beneficial for the 
economy  as  a  whole.  When  the  economy  protects  itself  with  adaptation,  the  optimal 
abatement effort can be smaller and the pollution level can be larger. Because the size of 
the economy is not the same, we compare abatement efforts as expressed per unit of capital 
K B / .  When  comparing  the  two  economies,  abatement  and  adaptation  appear  as 
substitutable policy instruments: a positive adaptation level reduces emission abatement 
efforts.  Actually,  the  interaction  between  adaptation  and  abatement  is  not  that 
straightforward  for  it  depends  on  the  country  characteristics.  The  following  corollary 
describes the optimal policy mix between adaptation and abatement. It shows how the 
optimal policy mix changes when the global factor productivity increases. The relationship 
is not monotonic, and the optimal adaptation level can also be zero.   
Corollary 3 (on the optimal adaptation policy). Under Proposition 3,  
 (i) the optimal abatement effort  K B /  is independent of the productivity level A;  
   (ii) the optimal policy mix  B D /  is zero when 0 < A < Ac, (Ac>0), it is increasing 
in A until a critical value Acr > Ac, and then it is decreasing in A when A > Acr
        
.  
   The two critical values on global productivity are  
) 1 ( 1
) 1 ( 1
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1 .                        (60)    
Proof. See Appendix 2. 
The first statement of this corollary has been already demonstrated for the model 
without  adaptation  in  Section  3.  The  statement  (ii)  is  new  and  has  major  policy 
implications. It states that, when the global productivity of the economy is weak, i.e. lower 
than a critical level Ac, then it is optimal to focus on abatement and not to spend money on 
adaptation. It is worth noting that the critical productivity level Ac depends negatively on  ﾠ  
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the  adaptation  potential  MK K   and  positively  on  the  minimal  vulnerability  level  .  Put 
differently, when the adaptation opportunities are wide (large MK K  and small  ), then the 
critical value for the global productivity above which the optimal adaptation is positive 
tends to zero. Let us consider, as an example, two countries with the same adaptation 
opportunities MK K  and   but with two different global productivities. Then, the optimal 
policy  may be no  adaptation  for  the  country  with  the  low  productivity  and  a  positive 
adaptation for the other country (depending on their relative position with respect to the 
critical value Ac). A graphical illustration is provided in Figure 2. Above the critical value 
Ac, adaptation is always positive, but its relative contribution to the optimal policy mix 
(adaptation/abatement ratio) first increases when the global productivity of the country 
increases, and then decreases. The turning point is Acr. When the global productivity is 
larger than Acr, the optimal policy mix decreases with the further productivity increase. 
Does  this  mean  that  the  country  must  increase  abatement  efforts  when  its  global 
productivity is high? No, because B/K is independent of A by Corollary 3-(i). This means 
that adaptation efforts D/K are reduced after Acr
aD e a D
     ) ( ) ( ' K K K
. The rationale behind this result is that 
abatement  has  a  constant  marginal  efficiency  (1/J)  while  adaptation  has  a  decreasing 
marginal efficiency ( ).  
       Now we compare the optimal values  D W   and  ND W  of the objective function 
(1) in two economies with and without adaptation and check which economic component 
causes  the  difference.  Let  us  assume  that  the  initial  conditions  K0,  D0,  P0  in  (3)-(5) 
coincide  with  the  optimal  solutions at  the  initial  moment,  K0 K = , D0 D =  and  P0 P = . 
Then, the optimization problem has no transition dynamics. Substituting equations (47) 



















































W              (62)      
In these two equations, the first term represents the contribution of consumption to 
welfare while the last term reflects the impact of the pollution.  
There are two differences between (61) and (62). First, the second (additional) term 
in (61) represents the opportunity cost of adaptation (crowding effect). The magnitude of 
this effect is represented by the ratio D/a  that can be interpreted as follows. Spending one 
dollar in adaptation contributes positively to welfare with a marginal technical efficiency 
weight a, but it has also an opportunity cost due to a lower capital accumulation because of 
the budget constraint (2) on the economy. A lower capital level induces a loss in output, 
weighted by D. So, the smaller the technical efficiency of adaptation with respect to D, the 
higher  the  opportunity  cost  of  adaptation  on  welfare.  Second,  the  pollution  impact  on 
welfare is weighted in (61) by the minimal vulnerability level K with adaptation, while it 
is weighted by the maximal vulnerability level K  when adaptation is not an option in (62).  ﾠ  
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We know that the pollution level is larger under adaptation, but this effect is offset by the 
difference between  K and K. When the country can reach a very high protection level 
(very small K), then the only positive effect of adaptation is to increase the consumption 
level. When the adaptation is available and optimally used, then the resources that are not 
spent for the pollution abatement can be used for capital accumulation, thus leading to a 
higher consumption level in the long run.    
 
5. A numerical illustration  
One of the goals of this paper is to interpret the optimal solution for countries with 
different characteristics. So it is natural to check that our key assumptions are empirically 
relevant that will be done in this section.  
Our model involves both economic and environmental variables, so a dimensional 
analysis of measurement units is a pre-requisite for a more meaningful model calibration. 
The  dimensional  analysis  is  rarely  used  in  environmental  economics  while  it  is  quite 
common in applied mathematicians, physics, and engineering for better understanding the 
relation among different quantities and checking the plausibility of derived equations (see, 
e.g.,  Kasprzak  et  al.,  1990).  In  financial  economics,  the  dimensional  analysis  is  also 
common in interpreting various financial, economic, and accounting ratios. In this section 
we shall use the common notation [x] for the unit of measurement (UOM) of a variable x. 
We  shall  first  present  the dimensional  analysis and  then  discuss  parameters  value  and 
assumptions. 
 
5.1. Dimensional analysis of the model 
It is convenient to choose a common UOM for all economic variables. In our case 
we will choose [B] = [C] = [D] = [K] = [Y] = 10
9 $ (billion US dollars). Following the 
common practice, the UOM for pollution will be [P] = 10
12 tC (trillion tons of carbon)
17. 
Let us now determine the measurement units for model parameters. It is obvious that D in 
(2) and P in (6) are dimensionless (they have no UOM), and that [U] = (time)
-1. Rewriting 
the pollution equation (5) as (J/GP) = (P+P’/GP)B/Y, one can see that [GP] = (time)
-1  and 
[J/GP] = [P] = 10
12 tC. Hence,  [J] = 10
12 tC/time. The parameter K  needs to be consistent 
with the objective function (6), which involves the logarithmic utility ln(C). Following the 
general rule of the dimensional analysis of transcendental functions such as logarithm, 
exponent, etc., we consider ln(C) as dimensionless (for the fixed UOM of the consumption 
C). It is natural from an economic viewpoint, because the utility U is based on customer 
preferences. So, we have that [K] = [P]
(-1-P = (10
12 tC)
(-1-P.  Finally, [A] = [Y]/[K]
 D = (10
9 
$)
1-D by (2), and [a] = (10
9 $)
-1
       Now we are ready to check the empirical relevance of our model, in particular 
assumptions A1, A2 and B. 
 by (44).  
                                                 
17 Or Giga tons of carbon.  ﾠ  
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5.2. Estimation of model parameters and regulation ranges 
       To set up some plausible values for the model parameters U,D, A, GP, J, P, K, 
and a, we use the most recent world data and parameters gathered by W.D. Nordhaus.
18 
World GDP in billion US dollars in 2005 was 61,100, and capital stock was 137,000. 
Using  D = 0.66,  we  get  a  global  factor  productivity  of  24.9.  Let  us  also  assume  that 
U = 0.01. The natural decay rate for carbon concentration in the atmosphere is known to be 
very  small.  Some  authors  even  consider  it to  be  zero, which  we  cannot  accept  in our 
model. We shall take GP = 0.00001 as a basis (decay rate per year). The current carbon 
concentration is [P] = 808.9 (10
12 tC) and the yearly rate of increase is P’/P = 0.3 percent. 
Then,  the  pollution  equation  (5)  in  the  form  (J/GP) = P[1+P’/(PGP)]B/Y  gives  us  the 
estimate  J/GP = P(1+0.003/0.00001)B/Y = 808.9B/Y  (10
9  tC/year).  By  assuming  that 
B/Y = 0.1, we end up with J/GP
          Let us now turn to the parameters of the utility function. First, the parameter 
P describes the marginal disutility of pollution; we shall take the conservative value of 
P = 0.5.  To  define  the  value  of  the  environmental  vulnerability  parameter  K,  the  only 
meaningful constraint is that utility should be non-negative. If we assume that consumption 
takes 65 percent of GDP, then we have  
 = 24,347.  









C  ln (0.6561.10010
9)1.5(808.9)
-1.5
By  taking  K = 0.002  and  G = 0,  the  value  of  the  N-indicator  of  environmental 
pressure is 7.75, which is larger than 1 and supports our Assumption A1.  
 = 0.002 
Finally,  the  adaptation  efficiency  function  (45)  in  Section  4  includes  two 
parameters: the adaptation range  K K  and the marginal efficiency a. For testing purposes, 
we shall assume that the maximal vulnerability (the one without adaptation) is the current 
one, so K  = 0.002, and the minimal vulnerability is twice as small: K=K /2. Thus, the 
adaptation  range  is  K K  = 0.001.  Let  us  further  assume  that  a = 0.00001.
19
) ( K K K    0 a
  Then  the 
maximal marginal adaptation efficiency is  =0.110
-6
N
. Hence, Assumption 
A2 holds (namely,   = 3.87 >> 1), as well as Assumption B: (Aa
1D/U)
1/D
Under this  set  of  the  given  model parameters,  the  optimal  policy  mix between 
adaptation  and  abatement  D/B  turns  out  to  be  0.63.  The  optimal  abatement  effort, 
expressed as the ratio B/K, amounts to 0.10 in the absence of adaptation, and it drops to 
0.04  with  adaptation.  This  numerical  calibration  also  provides  an  illustration  for  our 
Corollary  2.  In  particular,  it  shows  that  the  increase  in  the  pollution  level  due  to  the 
presence of adaptation is rather small (P
  = 371.02 >> 1.  
D/PND = 1.17) in comparison with the increase in 
the size of the economy (PD/PND
                                                 
18 The Nordhaus’ documentation is available on his web site: http://nordhaus.econ.yale.edu. 
 = 7.68).  
19 Let us recall that [a] = (10
9 $)
-1.  ﾠ  
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This  rough  calibration  shows  that  our  model,  although  stylized,  has  a  strong 
empirical relevance. It further shows that three assumptions A1, A2, and B are supported 
by the data. Sensitivity analyzes can easily be carried out for any economically relevant 
range  of  parameters  value.  For  instance,  when  changing  the  abatement  effort  in  the 
benchmark (B/Y) from 0.1 to 0.05, the three assumptions still hold and the optimal policy 
mix D/B goes down from 0.63 to 0.26.
20
 
   
6. Conclusion 
Combining  economic-environmental  growth  models  and  comparative  static 
analysis  with  perturbation  techniques,  we  have  derived  analytical  expressions  for  the 
optimal  policy  mix  between  emission  abatement  and  environmental  adaptation  at 
macroeconomic level. It allows us to investigate how the economy size shapes its optimal 
climate  policy.  It  is  shown  that  the  importance  of  adaptation  depends  on  the  stage  of 
country  development.  Specifically,  the  optimal  policy  mix  between  abatement  and 
adaption investments (the ratio D/B) depends on the country economic potential. One of 
the essential findings here is the inverted U-shape dependence of the optimal ratio D/B on 
the economy. If the economic efficiency is weak (lower than a certain critical level), then it 
is not optimal to invest into adaptation. So, in the case of a poor country, the optimal 
policy may be no adaptation at all. In the case of a developed country, this ratio remains 
rather low. The maximum adaptation efforts (in terms of D/B) should be done by medium-
developed countries.  
Our theoretical model can be extended in several directions. Adding an exponential 
population growth will not change the structure of obtained results. Then the endogenous 
variables IK, ID
Our model settings hold for a world economy, or a closed economy. By ‘closed’ we 
mean not only the absence of external trade but also a  closed interaction between the 
economy and the environment. In other words, the environment is not a public good in our 
setting, because all costs and benefits of environmental degradation accrue to the country. 
It is well recognized that climate change has the nature of a global public good and that its 
international dimension constitutes one of its cornerstones. Of particular interest for us 
would be to understand how the optimal policy of a given country depends, first, on its 
stage  of  development  and,  second,  on  its  position  in  the  international  area.  Other 
cornerstones for the climate change problem are its long term perspective, the existence of 
large  uncertainties  on  climate  change  impacts,  and  huge  distributional  effects  among 
, C, K, D, B, P will be per capita, and the actual parameters will grow 
exponentially. However, adding an (exogenous or endogenous) technological change to the 
production function (3) can alter the results significantly and make them more optimistic. 
The authors are going to exploit this issue later, following classical works (Gradus and 
Smulders, 1993; Stokey, 1998). An interesting approach is outlined by Bovenberg and 
Smulders  (1996)  who  explore  the  link  between  environmental  quality  and  economic 
growth in an endogenous growth model with pollution-augmenting technological change 
and examine sustainable growth.  
                                                 
20  Naturally,  a  sound  calibration  would  be  necessary  if  one  wants  to  draw  really  accurate  policy 
recommendations from our model, which was not the purpose of this short section.   ﾠ  
  21 
activity sectors and countries. Extending our model to a n-country model with strategic 
behaviors would be highly desirable to address this issue, but it raises new mathematical 
challenges and is out of the scope of the current paper.  
 
Appendix 1. Analysis of model (7)-(10) 
 
Proof of Proposition 1. 
Let us analyze the possibility of a steady state  
                          K(t) =K ,    C(t)=C ,    B(t)=B ,    
  P(t)=P .                
                                  (A1)  
in the model (7)-(10). The substitution of (A1) into (18)-(21) leads to  
, C B K K A    G
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                                                          (A3) 
Using (A2) we express the steady state  B ,C , and  P  in the terms of  K as (22)-(24). 
Substituting these formulas into (A3), we obtain the following equation for K : 
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.              (A4) 
To  show  that  (A4)  has  a  unique  solution,  let  us  introduce  the  new  unknown  variable 
D
D




x  and use notation (27) for the parameter N, Then equation (A4) takes the 
following dimensionless form: 
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2 ) 1 (
) (  of (A5) strictly decreases from  f at x=0 to  0 ) 1 (   F  and 
intersects the horizontal line  0 ) ( !   N x G  at some point x* (see Figure 3). Then, equation 
(A4), or (25) in the theorem, has a unique solutionK , 0<K <  D U G D   1
1
) /( A .
     
Proof of formulas (28)-(29) 
For the purposes of our future analysis, we need an approximate analytic solution of (A4). 
Let us consider two situations when it is possible.   ﾠ  
  22 
Case 1: the parameter N is large, N>>1. Then, presenting (A5) as 
P N
   
2 ) 1 ( x x , we see 
that 0<x<<1. Using the Taylor expansion of
P  
2 ) 1 ( x , we obtain  ) ( ) 2 ( 1 x o x x      P N  








x o x o x   or  
N
1
# x , which justifies (28). The condition 
N>>1 can be replaced with 
P P G G U KJ P P) (
1  !!
   because the parameter D is fixed and 
D<1 (in real economies, D|0.8). 









 with respect to 
the unknown z=1-x, we see that z<<1. Using the Taylor expansion of 
1 ) 1 (
  z , we obtain 
that   N
P   
 )] ( 1 [
2 z O z    or  
) 2 /( 1  #
P N z ,  which leads to (29).                              
 
Appendix 2: Analysis of model (1)-(6) with adaptation 
 
Proof of Proposition 2. 
With no capital depreciation, G=0, equalities (39)-(43) produce the following equations 
     C B K A   
D ,       ,
1 U D D
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P D ,                           (A7) 















.                          (A8) 
for the steady state  K(t)=K , C(t)=C , B(t)=B , P(t)=P , D(t)=D . The explicit formulas 
(46)-(48)  are  obtained  from  (A6).  Combining  (46)-(48)  and  (A7),  we  can  write  the 
following nonlinear equation  
























,                                   (A9) 
where  D  should be found from the nonlinear equation (A8). Combination of (44) and 
(A9) gives (49).Then, differentiating (44) and using (A8) and (48) we obtain (50)    
Let us notice that C o0 by (47) and  P P G J / o  by (48) asK o0. Since  0 ) ( '  d  D b K  
by (44), the equation (A8) cannot have a solution  D >0 for small values of  K . It means 
that the extremum condition (43) for the interior optimal  D >0 is not satisfied and the 
optimal  D  is boundary, that is,D =0, for small  K . Hence, there is no adaptation (D =0)  ﾠ  
  23 
and  K K K     ) 0 ( ) (D  in (A9) for some small  K >0. In this case, equation (A9) has the 
unique  positive  solution  K which  satisfies  the  approximate  formulas  (28)-(29)  at 
K K   (as the similar equation (25)).                                               
Proof of Proposition 3. 
       Let us analyze the possibility whether equation (A8) can have a solution  D >0. Let 
(A8) hold a priori. Then from equations (44), (46)-(48), and (A8) we get  





















.                             (A10)    
and, substituting (A10) into (45),  
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) ( ˆ ) ( .                   (A11) 
As  in  Appendix  1,  we  use  dimensionless  variables  to  simplify  the  further  analysis. 
Substituting (A11) into (A9) and using the unknown 
D
D
U   
1 K
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,             (A12) 
we obtain one dimensionless equation 
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strictly decreases from fat x=0 to  0 ) 1 (   F  and is the same as in equation (A5). The right-
hand function  
D
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P           (A14) 
strictly  decreases  from  fat  x=0  to  N   at  x=1  (see  Figure  4).  Moreover,  G(x)N   by 











.   Therefore, we are interested only in solutions 
x* from the interval [xcr,1], where xcr>0 is such that G(xcr)=F(xcr)=N . So, the value xcr is 
the solution of the equation   ﾠ  
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.          (A15) 
It is easy to see that the functions F(x) and G(x) intersect at x*xcr and the equation (A13) 
has a unique solution xcrx*<1, if and only if G(xcr) N (see Figure 4) or  
D
P


























a           (A16) 
       To obtain a priori condition for the solvability of equation (A13) in the terms of given 
model parameters, let us consider the special case N >>1 (Case 1 of Section 3). Then, the 
equation (A15) has the approximate solution 
1  | N cr x . Its substitution into (A16) leads to 
D
D



















































which gives the formula (52) in the terms of the original parameters K , A, J and GP. 
This concludes the proof.
Proof of formulas (58)-(59) 
To find an approximate explicit formula for x and K , we assume that  
N























P .          (A17) 












                                        (A18) 
which is equation (A5). To obtain its approximate solution, let us assume additionally that 
1 !! N . Then, as shown in Section 3, equation (A18) has the unique positive solution 
x*
1  # N ,  that  leads  to  formula  (58).  Finally,  substituting  x*
1  # N and  (A12)  into  the 
inequality (A17) and combining the obtained result with  1 !! N , we get the condition (56). 
The  approximate  formula  (59)  for  D follows  from  substituting  (58)  into  (53)  and  the 
condition x*<<1.  
  
Proof of Corollary 3. 
Using (46) and (58), we represent the ratio K B / as  ﾠ  
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that justify the first part of Corollary 3.  
In order to prove part (ii) of Corollary 3, we analyze the ratio  B D /  obtained from (46), 
(58), and (59). First of all, (59) is valid if  1
) (
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To investigate the monotonicity of the ratio B D / , let us look at its first derivative in A:  
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The ratio B D / increases if   0 /
' ! A B D or, in terms of (A19), if 
                                                  cr c A A e A    
D 1 0 ,                                                  (A20) 
and decreases if   cr A A ! , which proves statement (ii) of Corollary 3.  
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Figure 1. The dependence of the environmental vulnerability K on the adaptation expense 
D . It tends to the horizontal asymptote K =K>0 when D grows indefinitely. The dashed 
curve has a larger adaptation efficiency parameter a than the solid curve. The dotted curve 
has a smaller parameter a than the solid one. 
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Figure 3. The point x*  is the unique solution of the nonlinear equation (A5). The strictly 
decreasing function y=F(x) represents the left-hand side of (A5) and the horizontal line 
0 !   N y  is its right-hand side. 
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Figure 4. The decreasing function y=F(x) represents the left-hand side of the nonlinear 
equation (A13) and the decreasing function y=G(x) represents its right-hand side (A14). 
Their intersection point x*  is the unique solution of the equation under condition (A16). 
The dotted curve show the case when G(x) is close to N  near x*  (then x*  is given by the 
approximate formula (58)). The gray function y=G(x) demonstrates the situation when 
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